Sunday, February 8, 2009

David Ignatius does not seem to understand the difference between the words "know" and "fear."

From Brad DeLong:

"
Washington Post Crashed-and-Burned Watch (David Ignatius Edition)

David Ignatius does not seem to understand the difference between the words "know" and "fear." It's an important difference.

Ignatius writes:

David Ignatius - The Death of 'Rational Man': What allowed some people to see the financial crash coming while so many others missed its gathering force? I put that question recently to Nouriel Roubini, who has come to be known as "Dr. Doom" because of his insistent warnings starting in 2006 that we were heading into a global firestorm.... Roubini knew two things: Housing prices wouldn't keep going up forever, and when they went down, they would take a big piece of the financial system with them. From then on, it was a matter of watching the data...

The problem--OK, one problem--is that David Ignatius does not appear to know that (the very smart) Nouriel Roubini also feared and also insistently warned, earlier, of an even bigger financial crash that did not happen:

Roubini and Setser, February 2005 http://tinyurl.com/dl20090207: [In the early 2000s] The Federal Reserve responded aggressively to the sharp falls in US equity markets, and the Bush Administration added a massive fiscal stimulus to the Fed’s monetary stimulus: as Ken Rogoff (2003) has noted, the US recovery was the best recovery money could buy.... [F]oreign central banks were unwilling to let their currencies fall against the dollar, and intervened massively... a seemingly unlimited credit line from the world’s central banks funded the expansion of the US fiscal deficit, preventing the growing stock of Treasuries from crowding out private investment....

A cooperative grand bargain... offers the best chance for unwinding of the US external imbalance without a sharp deceleration of US and global growth. However, such a bargain looks increasingly unlikely.... China may be willing to add $240 billion, or even $300 billion, to its reserves for another year. We doubt it will be willing to do so for two more years.... [T]he risk [of] a disorderly unraveling... a sharp correction of the US dollar and of the US bond market, a surge in US long-term interest rates, a sharp fall in the price of a wide variety of risky assets (such a equities, housing, high-yield bonds, and emerging market sovereign debt) – are growing. Such an unraveling could result in a sharp economic slowdown in the US. It will force countries that now depend on US demand growth for their growth to adjust as well...

Why oh why can't we have a better press corps"

Me:

I'm not sure what your argument is. Are you saying that, because he was wrong before, he couldn't be correct now? Are you saying that he was lucky? That he specializes in predictions and then counts on people forgetting the ones that don't come true?

As to what he knew, it does seem possible that he knew that housing prices would have to come down or at least stabilize at some point. So, for me, he knows one thing.

Could he also have known that it would take a big piece of the financial system with it? I don't think so. I would argue that the government's actions have contributed to the problems. He couldn't have known those actions, for example, in advance. But I do believe that anyone who follows Fisher's Debt-Deflation model at all could have known that there was a real possibility of the housing market drop causing a major problem, and, unless we acted quickly and effectively, the problem could spiral out of hand. Knowing that, people who were aware that on the Sunday before Lehman was left to fail Merrill was likely to go next, could know that the chances of a debt-deflation spiral occurring were very possible.

As to whether I'm using the word "know" correctly, that's a tough problem:

349. "I know that that's a tree" - this may mean all sorts of things: I look at a plant that I take for a young beech and that someone else thinks is a black-currant. He says "that's a shrub"; I say it is a tree. - We see something in the mist which one of us takes for a man, and the other says "I know that that's a tree". Someone wants to test my eyes etc.etc. - etc.etc. Each time the 'that' which I declare to be a tree is of a different kind.
But what when we express ourselves more precisely? For example: "I know that that thing there is a tree, I can see it quite clearly." - Let us even suppose I had made this remark in the context of a conversation (so that it was relevant when I made it); and now, out of all context, I repeat it while looking at the tree, and I add "I mean these words as I did five minutes ago". If I added, for example, that I had been thinking of my bad eyes again and it was a kind of sigh, then there would be nothing puzzling about the remark.
For how a sentence is meant can be expressed by an expansion of it and may therefore be made part of it. Wittgenstein On Certainty

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